

Questions Posted in Meeting - 7th Review Meeting of the Joint Convention

Filters	
Posted By	
Posted To	Hungary
Article	
Status	

Question Id	Posted By	Posted To	Article	Ref. in National Report	Question / Comment	Status	Answer	Support Documents	Last Activity On
24486	Bulgaria	Hungary	Article 32.2.4	D.2.4	<p>The report states:                      "The discharging of gaseous radio-isotopes (tritium, radioactive noble gases, etc.) always takes place within the discharge limits, and under constant control."                      Question:                      How is the regulatory control over the radioactive discharges organized?</p>	Answer updated	<p>A radiological monitoring system must be operated to determine the radioactive releases at facilities of special importance (nuclear power plant, research reactor, training reactor, uranium mine, radioactive waste repository, A-level isotope laboratory, spent fuel interim storage facility). According to point b) of Section 2 of Paragraph 6 of the Decree of the Minister of Environment 15/2001. (VI.6.) on the radioactive releases (hereinafter: Decree) the facilities of special importance shall measure and determine the discharges in accordance with the Discharge Control Regulations (hereinafter: ECR) established on the basis of the requirements of its Annex 4 and approved by the resolution of the Environmental Protection Authority. According to point c) of Section 2 of Paragraph 6 of the Decree facilities of special importance in accordance with the ECR make possible the sampling necessary for authority control, on-site measurements, and provide samples for all of these to the Laboratory Section of the Public Health Department of the Baranya County Government Office (hereinafter: the Laboratory Section). In case of facilities of special importance, according to Sections 1 and 2 of Paragraph 12 of the Decree the Environmental Protection Authority, alongside with the Laboratory Section, annually supervises compliance with provisions regarding the radioactive releases and their impact on the environment. The related radiological measurements in respect of all environmental elements are performed by the Laboratory Section with national competence in accordance with points 1, 2 and 3 of the Annex 4 of the Decree.</p>		2022-03-31 14:42:35
24383	France	Hungary	Article 20.2	Section E.2 - page 47	<p>The Centre for Energy Research of the Hungarian Academy of Science (HAS CER) is the licensed operator of the Paks NPP and the Institute of Nuclear Techniques at Budapest University of Technology &amp; Economics Institute of Nuclear Techniques (BUTE INT) is the licensed operator of the Training reactor. Yet, the report from Hungary mentions that the Hungarian Atomic Energy Authority (HAEA) has concluded agreements with several scientific institutions and professional companies, in the cases when it does not possess the required expertise, notably with the HAS CER and the BUTE INT.                       How are managed bilateral relations between the HAEA and respectively, HAS CER and BUTE INT, so that the HAEA preserve its independence?</p>	Answer updated	<p>First of all, it has to be clarified that the Centre for Energy Research of the Hungarian Academy of Science (HAS CER) is the licensed operator of the Budapest Research Reactor instead of the Paks NPP (as it was mentioned in the question). In order to support the HAEA in carrying out its tasks, it has at its disposal the possibility to involve experts from TSOs. This is provided by the Act on Atomic Energy, which stipulates that nuclear safety is the first and foremost priority of the use of atomic energy. In order to be able to take into account current and future advances in technology it must be supported by a robust system of R&amp;D, looking at domestic as well as international advances in the field of nuclear energy and utilizing those results in our regulatory work or to train staff. This programme supports the HAEA in its regulatory work and is used in cases where the regulatory body does not possess certain expertise or resources are unavailable at a given point in time.                      In order to ensure that support is readily available in such cases, there are MoUs (memorandum of understanding) in force with certain larger research institutions where the parties agree to support the HAEA's work as technical support organizations. The specific nature of the cooperation are governed in individual contractual agreements based on the particular task at hand.                      These institutions also commit themselves to be readily available to provide the HAEA with high-level support (e.g.: calculation, brief overview etc.) at no cost in case of</p>		2022-03-31 14:41:18

24384	France	Hungary	Article 32.1.3	Section D.2 - page 35	<p>The report from Hungary mentions that the radioactive material may be released from regulatory control "with a notification".</p> <p>What does this notification mean in practice? Is there any kind of regulatory follow-up after the release? Could Hungary elaborate on the potential reuse or recycling of released material?</p>	Answer updated	<p>The obligation is regulated by Government Decree 487/2015 (XII.30.), where the radioactive material to be released must be presented, it must be proved that it actually falls below the required values. The decree provides sufficient time for the HAEA to react if any data or measurements are still needed.</p> <p>37. Notification obligation Section 57</p> <p>(1) The licensee or the owner shall notify the HAEA of*</p> <p>b) * exemption of radioactive material with the conditions determined in Subsection (1) of Section 3, by specifying the form, quantity and activity and activity concentration by isotopes of the exempted material, and the organization performing the further management of the material,</p> <p>ba) in case of quantity complying with the requirements determined in Paragraph a) of Subsection (1) of Section 3, not exceeding 1 ton/year, until 31 January following the subject year,</p> <p>bb) in case of quantity complying with the requirements determined in Paragraph a) of Subsection (1) of Section 3, exceeding 1 ton/year, at least 30 days before the planned exemption of the material quantity above 1 ton,</p> <p>bc) in the case according to Paragraph b) of Subsection (1) of Section 3 at least 30 days before the planned exemption,</p> <p>The HAEA keeps a database of the released radioactive materials. It also takes into account substances that have already been placed in the clearance procedures.</p> <p>2. Release</p>	2022-03-31 14:40:27
16655	Slovakia	Hungary	Article 25	F.5.5, p. 66	<p>In light of the pandemic situation what measures have been taken to assure emergency exercises? Where these exercises postponed or other arrangements have been taken by the licensee and approved by the competent authorities?</p>	Answered	<p>(Assuming that the "Where" in the question is meant to be "Were".) The pandemic started in Hungary about March 2020. During that year, in general, facilities of PURAM tried to avoid activities that involve too many workers. The RWTFD held a comprehensive emergency exercise in December 2020, while the SFISF and the NRWR held their respective comprehensive emergency exercises at the end of 2021. In case of NRWR, the exercise was postponed one year. Nevertheless, all facilities comply with the law in this regard. During these exercises, personnel followed the pandemic regulations of PURAM, for example, they wore facemasks and tried to simulate more events during the exercises than usual, particularly leaving out the Hungarian National Ambulance Service, which was extremely loaded of course. This means that special measures were not necessary.</p>	2022-03-31 14:14:44

16654	Slovakia	Hungary	General	H.3, p. 79	The reports states that on the initiative of the local government of Bataapáti, a referendum was held in the village in 2005 concerning the implementation of the NRWR in the area of the village. Was similar referendum being held in the other facility site, Püspökszilágy? If so, with which results? If not, what is generally the acceptance of RAW treatment and disposal activities in the surroundings of RWTDF?	Answered	<p>It is not a legal requirement in Hungary to organize a binding referendum in the frame of the implementation process of a repository. In the case of Bataapáti, the municipality in agreement with PURAM organized a local referendum concerning the potential implementation of the repository, the participation was high (75%), and the huge majority (90.7%) supported the construction of the repository.</p> <p>In the case of Püspökszilágy repository (RWTDF) a referendum was not organized in the 1970's. PURAM took over the responsibility on the facility in 1998 and takes the opinion of the public seriously into account. Every 2-3 years opinion polls are carried out to monitor the attitude of the local people, their views and opinion on the activities and the facility. The last opinion poll survey was carried out in 2021. Comparing the results from 2018 the acceptance of the facility (72% =&gt; 77%) has increased. The latter result is based on the answers for the question: 'To what extent do you accept the operation of the repository?', where six answers could be given: totally accept, rather accept, rather reject, totally reject, not know, not answer. From the 744 questioned local people 23% totally accept and 54% rather accept the operation of the facility.</p>	2022-03-31 14:13:58
16653	Slovakia	Hungary	General	H.2, p. 77	Which corrective actions have been performed as a result of periodic safety review of RWTDF?	Answered	<p>Many administrative measures have been performed as result of the periodic safety review, for example: the licensee reviewed the safety assessment on events of natural origin that affect the safety of the facility taking into consideration WENRA recommendations. PURAM also has developed ageing management and maintenance documents in accordance with the current legislation, a review of the safety zone of the facility was carried out, the results of beyond the design basis malfunction (accidents) analysis were assessed on a risk basis. PURAM has developed a guide document dealing with accidents, clarifications were made to the operational instructions to ensure the safe operation of the facility, a periodic inspection program to verify the compliance of the containment barriers was developed, a comprehensive review of the increased tritium and radiocarbon concentrations in groundwater was also required.</p>	2022-03-31 14:13:14
17129	United States of America	Hungary	Article 27	An2.2.3, p. 100	With regard to the import of low-level waste from other countries, please explain surveillance processes or controls followed at the Hungarian border to ensure that contaminated or high-risk sources or waste are surveyed properly.	Answered	<p>According to legal restrictions import of radioactive waste to Hungary is prohibited [Govt decree 34/2009 (II. 20.) on licensing of the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and spent fuel 10.§ f). At certain border crossing points fix border portal monitors are installed in order to detect radioactive material in a cargo by measuring the elevated radiation level, when crossing the Hungarian border without being declared as radioactive shipment. If these monitors detect elevated radiation level, the conveyance should be stopped and competent authorities should be warned for further investigation of the cargo. Detailed guidances for this protocol can be found on the website of the HAEA (<a href="http://www.oah.hu/">www.oah.hu/</a> Effective guidelines ) to help the staff on spot which steps should be followed in these cases.</p>	2022-03-31 14:12:40

17128	United States of America	Hungary	Article 7	B.2, p. 28	The expansion of the National Radioactive Waste Repository is authorized by the Public Health Authority of the Tolna County Government Office. The disposal of the first, new type waste packages will be consistent with the transportation schedule from Paks Nuclear Power Plant in 2021. Please describe the review and authorization process for these new waste packages to evaluate their safety and integrity. Additionally, is the expansion of the repository expected to conclude in 2021?	Answered	The optimization of the disposal concept of the NRWR started in 2010. Several preliminary analyses showed the feasibility, which were developed by the waste generator (Paks NPP) and the waste management organization (PURAM) together. Based on these preliminary studies the decision was made on the conceptual change and the licensing procedures were initiated. Firstly, based on an environmental impact study, the environmental protection licence was modified. After that, based on a preliminary safety assessment report (PSAR) the construction licence of the repository was modified and based on technical designs the construction licence for the new engineered barrier (reinforced concrete vault) was issued. As part of the PSAR the preliminary waste acceptance criteria and the package qualification system have been developed. In 2017 based on the final safety assessment report, the operational licence was issued for the I-K2 chamber, where the new disposal concept will be implemented. In the frame of this licensing step public hearing was organized. Currently the Paks NPP is working on the finalization of the cementation technology, which is necessary to solidify the liquid wastes for the new waste packages. According to the updated schedule, the first packages can be received at the second half of 2022.		2022-03-31 14:12:01
18851	Austria	Hungary	Article 14	H: Safety of Radioactive Waste Management	Are there any legislative requirements for the decommissioning of a RAW Management facility?	Answered	The requirements for decommissioning a RAW management facility can be found in the 155/2014 Govt. Decree (mentioned in the E.1.2 section of the Report). Although the Hungarian legislation regulates decommissioning activities only regarding the systems and structures in the RAW management facilities and not regarding the (entire) facility. Besides these requirements there are administrative requirements and strictly safety requirements, too.		2022-03-31 14:11:22
19158	Spain	Hungary	Article 21	F.1, pg. 54	Concerning these two responsibilities assigned to PURAM: 1. elaboration of its medium- and long-term plans (strategies); 2. elaborating cost estimates to identify the necessary payments into the CNFF each year; Does the legislative framework establish any periodicity for its revision and update?	Answered	The medium- and long-term plan has to be based on the national programme of Hungary, which is developed according to the requirements of 2011/70/EURATOM Directive. Based on the Act on Atomic Energy, the national programme has to be reviewed and updated every five years. Major strategical changes can be done within this revision process. Based on Govt. Decree 215/2013. (VI. 21.) the medium- and long-term plan has to be updated every year. Within this yearly update only slight technical changes and programme schedule adjustments are made and the yearly cost escalation rates are considered to calculate the payment of Paks NPP to the Fund.		2022-03-31 14:10:41
19157	Spain	Hungary	Article 32	D.2.5., pg 41	The report refers "The accepted decommissioning strategy (for Paks NPP) includes a 20 year safe enclosure period of the primary circuit; thus it entails postponed dismantling. "Could you please further elaborate the expected advantages of this decommissioning strategy for Paks NPP?"	Answered	The expected advantages of the preferred decommissioning strategy for Paks NPP are: - there is no need to build storage facility for HLW, because of absence of a disposal facility for HLW, - the interim storage facility (SFISF) for spent fuel can be dismantled at the same time as the units of the NPP, - reduced costs, when expressed as Net Present Values after discounting over the 20 years period.		2022-03-31 14:10:03

19156	Spain	Hungary	Planned Activities	Identified Suggestions, Pag 17	Could you please further elaborate the characteristics and planned activities for the repository serving for the disposal of very low level radioactive wastes?	Answered	In the Hungarian legislation the new waste category (VLLW) has been introduced as a subcategory of low level wastes. Nevertheless, the category exists, the detailed requirements for the implementation of a VLLW repository has not been issued in the legislation, yet. Due to the lack of detailed requirements PURAM has developed a preliminary concept for the disposal of VLLW in a landfill type of repository based on the good international practices (CIREs France, El Cabril Spain) and taking into account the approaches used for hazardous waste disposal in Hungary. Once the concept is approved and the detailed requirements are issued, the site selection and implementation programme can start.	2022-03-31 14:09:21
19155	Spain	Hungary	Planned Activities	Identified Challenges, Pag 12	Could you please report about the current status of the scheduled project for the expansion of of the SFISF with increased capacity vaults: 2020-2024. construction of vaults 25-28.	Answered	The civil engineering works of the extension are going ahead according to the schedule. By the end of 2021 the foundation, the basement, the walls and the ceiling of the vaults were constructed and the exhaust stack reached the level of 12 m. The production of the mechanical technological systems have also been started with the charge face structures (positioning the storage tubes at the ceiling of the vaults). The production licensing of the storage tubes is ongoing, which can cause some few months of delay in the project.	2022-03-31 14:08:41
19261	Ireland	Hungary	Article 32	B.2.1, page 27	The multiyear programme launched to enhance the long-term safety of the RWTFD involved segregating 'critical' waste types from the recovered waste from certain vaults. Has Hungary already decided or know what type of treatment these 'critical' waste types will be required to be submitted to before they are made safer?	Answered	The treatment of the critical waste types had been decided and planned as follows: 1. Sorting and repacking of the long-lived (or higher activity) disused sealed sources (DSS). DSSs are going to be packaged into small metal capsules, which will be welded after closure. The metal capsules will be temporarily stored in „wells“. The final disposal of DSSs will be according to their properties: long-lived and higher acitivity DSSs are going to be emplaced in the (future) HLW disposal facility. 2. Sorting of long-lived and/or higher activity waste packages, paying special attention to Ra-226, Th-232 or Uranium content. These type of wastes will be separately handled, they will be repacked (or overpacked), compacted (if possible). The final disposal of these wastes will take place in the (future) HLW disposal facility.	2022-03-31 14:08:00
19263	Ireland	Hungary	Article 19	E.1, page 42	Hungary's report states that the Act on Atomic Energy [I.6] does not consider radioactive waste management facilities to be nuclear facilities. Can Hungary clarify this statement given the definition of 'nuclear facility' under Article 2 (f) of the Joint Convention on the Safety of Spent fuel Management and on the Safety of Radioactive Waste Management?	Answered	Nuclear facility in Hungarian law is defined by the Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy, Section 2, definition 7. Nuclear facility: a) enrichment facility, nuclear fuel fabrication facility, nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, nuclear fuel examination laboratory, research reactor, training reactor, nuclear critical and other system applied for neutron multiplication, facility used for storage of fresh nuclear fuel or interim storage of spent nuclear fuel, b) facilities located at the same site as the nuclear facilities listed in Para. a) and directly connected thereto, and used for the storage of radioactive wastes, if they are considered as separate facilities.  Also by this Act, definition 16. states: a radioactive waste repository is a facility used for permanent disposal and interim storage of radioactive waste.	2022-03-31 14:07:03

19264	Ireland	Hungary	Article 22	F.2.1.1, page 56	The competences of the HAEA were expanded following the transfer of statutory powers and functions from other regulatory bodies/ministries sometimes in 2016 (see Section E.1, page 42). Is it for this reason that the HAEA workforce was increased by 5% in 2019? Was the new staff specifically recruited to address these new regulatory functions? Did this expansion of competences require some re-organisation or restructuring of the regulatory body?	Answered	Staff was increased in line with the anticipated work load of the regulatory body mainly in connection with the Paks II project as per Government Resolution 1836/2014. The number of staff members at the HAEA has been gradually increasing in line with the increased workload resulting from the statutory changes as well as in preparation of the licensing work connected to the Paks II project. The statutory changes that happened in 2016 brought about an increase as well, to a smaller extent. HAEA was reorganized to better cope with the new functions, the results of which can be seen in Figure E.2.1-1 of the report.		2022-03-31 14:06:22
19266	Ireland	Hungary	Article 25	F.5.7, page 67-68	The proactive and leading role of Hungary and the HAEA as a host for and organiser of international emergency exercises (IAEA and EU) is acknowledged a good performance.	Answered	It is highly appreciated by Hungary that Ireland acknowledges the proactive and leading role of HAEA as host and organiser of international emergency exercises.		2022-03-31 14:05:42
19680	Ireland	Hungary	Article 1	Ref. in National Report Annex 7, page 129	Does Hungary intend to recycle/re-use the uranium concentrate which has been produced as a result of the decontamination of the contaminated water in the now closed uranium mine? If not, it is unclear if it is accounted for in the inventories of radioactive waste presented in the report under Section D.2.	Answered	Hungary does not intend to recycle/re-use the produced U concentrate. After a short (1-2 years) temporary storage period the total amount of concentrate is exported in the frame of a long-term contract, as yellow cake (UO <sub>2</sub> 2H <sub>2</sub> O). Therefore, it is not accounted into the radioactive waste inventory.		2022-03-31 14:05:08
20162	Australia	Hungary	Article 27	Page 85	HAEA is the Authority with NPH as the co-authority. How does this arrangement work? Can the NPH approve transportation separately to the HAEA?	Answered	The decisions of the HAEA regarding transboundary shipment according to Council Directive 2006/117/EURATOM of 20 November 2006 on the supervision and control of shipments of radioactive waste and spent fuel are supported by National Police Headquarters (NPH) as a co-authority. The official procedure is provided in the Govt. Decree 34/2009.(II. 20.) on licensing of the transboundary movement of radioactive waste and spent fuel. The HAEA conducts the procedure as the competent and responsible authority and asks expert opinion from NPH in special police-related issues as a part of this procedure. The NPH has no legal possibility or competence to issue an approval separately in this procedure.		2022-03-31 14:04:20
20161	Australia	Hungary	Article 25	Page 65/66	Do the nuclear emergency response plans fully aligned with the IAEA's GSR Part 7	Answered	No, the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan is not yet fully in line with GSR Part 7. A working group is established and has been working on the implementation of each of the requirements of GSR Part 7.		2022-03-31 14:02:06
20160	Australia	Hungary	Article 22	Page 56	In relation to financial support behind training, what level of support is granted in order to support and develop the regulator to ensure its continued competence?	Answered	Planning training activities begins in the year preceding the reference year by surveying the needs, reviewed by managers and from budgetary aspects. Taking into account all the necessary trainings, there is a separate part in the budget to finance training to develop and to ensure the regulator's continuous competences.		2022-03-31 13:59:24
20159	Australia	Hungary	Article 20	Page 46	Commendation on level of transparency and the evolution of education through the conference to students and output of literature Andy's comment - USA gave similar commendation at last review meeting	Answered	Hungary appreciates that the level of transparency and the evolution of education through the conferences to students are recognized also by Australia.		2022-03-31 13:58:46
20158	Australia	Hungary	Article 19	Page 45	Have any such fines been issued? From the experience of the HAEA, how are fines comparable to other enforcement options (additional licence conditions, suspension or withdrawal of licence) in relation to achieving licence holder compliance?	Answered	Regarding PURAM, the HAEA imposed its first fine in 2019. Till the end of 2021, the HAEA imposed 7 fines altogether, in total in a value of 3.1 million HUF. The fines are scaled by the law, the weight of the non-compliance, and by the graded approach, so the sums are relatively small. There was one case concluded with a partial suspension of the licence, instead of the fine. Given these figures, there is not enough experience yet to assess the effects of the fines, compared to other methods.		2022-03-31 13:58:06

20157	Australia	Hungary	Article 11	Page 26	Please clarify the absence of waste acceptance criteria from the repository	Answered	The cited sentence ("In the absence of waste acceptance criteria, the repository has accepted almost all kinds of radioactive wastes generated during the utilisation of nuclear technology and isotope applications.") is about the past of the RWTF repository which was commissioned in 1976. After that PURAM took over the responsibility on the facility in 1998, PURAM immediately carried out a series of safety assessments and determined the WAC for the storage and for the disposal as well. Based on the outcomes of the safety assessments a safety upgrading programme has been established, which - among others - aims to retrieve those waste packages from the repository, which do not comply with the current WAC for disposal.	2022-03-31 13:57:22
20156	Australia	Hungary	Article 10	Page 24	When will a decision need to be made regarding Spent Fuel from the BRR given the termination of the intergovernmental agreement? - Though it is recognised that the BRR has large storage capacity available	Answered	The policy of closing the fuel-cycle with regard to spent fuel not originating from nuclear power plants in Hungary, is that our country makes use of the possibility of returning it to Russia. The national policy and program for spent fuel and radioactive waste management takes it into account as reference. To this end negotiations are foreseen to prepare an intergovernmental agreement.  Should the repatriation option not be exploited in the future, the policy states that management and disposal of spent fuel from the Research Reactor and Training Reactor have to be taken place in Hungary.  The BRR external SNF storage is operating, and large enough for covering the need of at least 30-40 years of operation.	2022-03-31 13:56:46
20155	Australia	Hungary	Article 5	Multiple references - general question	The plants at Paks have been given 20 year service life extensions with the SFISF being expanded to account for this. Considering the direct disposal scenario for SP/HLW takes into account a facility (BCF) which is still being researched/developed, how will the 2 new VVER-1200 reactors impact the SFISF and influence the High Active Waste/Spent Fuel Disposal Facility?	Answered	Concerning the planned Paks 2 units a new spent fuel interim storage facility has to be constructed, because the geometry and mass of the VVER-1200 spent fuel significantly differ from VVER-440 spent fuel, so the modification of the currently operating SFISF is not possible. Concerning the planned geological disposal facility the co-disposal of VVER-440 and VVER-1200 can be implemented, but the new built units can have significant influences to the project. Within the design basis the bigger and much heavier spent fuel assemblies have to be considered. The mass of heavy metal to be disposed of for the two NPPs will be more than double, so the excavated volume of rock and the footprint of the repository will be much higher. The new units could be operational almost until the end of the century after which the cooling of spent fuel will be necessary for decades before disposal. This results that the operational period of the geological disposal facility will be significantly longer to be able to dispose of spent fuel from Paks2.	2022-03-31 13:56:06
20154	Australia	Hungary	General	Annex 7	Are any additional remediation works planned or under consideration in order to reduce water leakage in the future?	Answered	On the Hungarian U mining and ore-processing legacy site the remediation works were completed in 2008. Recently, active water pumping and water treatment system are operated in order to minimize water leakage from the mining area and for the protection of the neighbouring drinking water supplying area. The water contaminants (U, salinity) are removed and the cleaned water is discharged into a river.	2022-03-31 13:55:28

20153	Australia	Hungary	General	D.1.5.6 p52	Is there any ongoing monitoring following the release of the Ranstad uranium mining and milling facility site from regulatory control?	Answered	It is an inadequate question since Ranstad uranium mining and milling facility does not exist in Hungary. Nevertheless, on the Hungarian U mining and ore-processing legacy site the regulatory control has not released most of the remediated mining objects (waste-rock piles, tailings ponds, facility areas). A comprehensive long term monitoring system is operated for the quality and radioactivity control all of the elements of environment (groundwater, surface waters, air, soil, plants) and for the radiation dose of population/workers.	2022-03-31 13:54:44
21295	Japan	Hungary	Planned Activities	P.12	It is described that in the Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility (RWTDF), a lightweight building is installed covering cranes on top of the pool for improvement of work conditions. How the safety design of the aforementioned building is credited, e.g. seismic safety or protection against falling objects?	Answered	The lightweight building was designed in line with the MSZ EN 1990 – 1999 standards („Basis of structural design”). During the design of the load bearing structures of the lightweight building the requirements of MSZ EN 1998-1:2008 Eurocode 8 („Design of structures for earthquake resistance”) standard were taken into account. The structure of the containment, located in the lightweight building, was designed in accordance with the Eurocode 8 regulation’s national Annex, using $agR=0.1$ g peak horizontal acceleration. Regarding the design of the lifting devices, generally applied national regulations and standards were taken into account (MSZ EN 15011:2011 „Cranes. Bridge and gantry cranes”; Decree of the Minister of Economy 47/1999. (VIII.4.) on Lifting device Safety Policy; Decree of the Minister for National Development and Economy 16/2008. (VIII.30.) on safety requirements of machines, and certification of conformity). Administrative procedures will be developed for protection of falling objects.	2022-03-31 13:54:02
21294	Japan	Hungary	Article 19	P.42	The Act of Atomic Energy states that radioactive waste management facilities (e.g. repository) are by definition, not considered as nuclear facilities. Does it mean the said facility has not active function and should be considered passive function for radiation protection only? On the contrary, how the nuclear facility is defined legally?	Answered	Nuclear facility in Hungarian law is defined by the Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy, Point 7 in Section 2 nuclear facility: a) enrichment facility, nuclear fuel fabrication facility, nuclear power plant, reprocessing plant, nuclear fuel examination laboratory, research reactor, training reactor, nuclear critical and other system applied for neutron multiplication, facility used for storage of fresh nuclear fuel or interim storage of spent nuclear fuel, b) facilities located at the same site as the nuclear facilities listed in Para. a) and directly connected thereto, and used for the storage of radioactive wastes, if they are considered as separate facilities.  However, this does not mean that repository facilities are considered only passive function for radiation protection only. For example, related to the Radioactive Waste Treatment and Disposal Facility the licensee can do all of the predisposal activities.	2022-03-31 13:52:19
21293	Japan	Hungary	Planned Activities	P.14	From Executive Summary 5.1, it is understood that the Paks NPP spent fuel is planned to be in wet storage in the spent fuel pool (SFP) on the site for 10 years at the maximum, and dry storage in the interim storage facility (SFISF) on the site or its vicinity, followed by in dry storage in the final depository within a deep stable geological formation. Are there any comprehensive plan of storage time duration for each storage?	Answered	The National Program (according to Government Decree 1459/2016. (VIII. 24.)) contains the strategy for the spent fuel and radioactive waste long-term management. There are multiple options for the management of the spent fuel after the interim storage in the cooling pools at reactor halls (e.g. storage in Hungary or transporting spent fuel abroad for reprocessing etc.). We continue applying the „do-and-see” principle thus there are juncture points determined where decisions have to be made for a particular solution regarding the spent fuel management. The reference scenario (domestic direct disposal) - related to the storage times - considers a 10-year spent fuel pool storage and an interim storage in Hungary till the starting of the operation of the DGR.	2022-03-31 13:51:36



24386	France	Hungary	Article 32.1.3	Section D - pages33-36	Hungary has presented detailed information regarding the classification of waste types, showing a nicely structured methodology with quantified limits between the different waste types in terms of activities and half-lives of radionuclides. This level of detail will undoubtedly be of precious value to all Member States.	Answered	Hungary appreciates France's acknowledgement for the detailed information given by Hungary regarding the classification of waste types.		2022-03-31 13:50:41
24385	France	Hungary	Article 32.1.4	Annex 7 - page 129	Could Hungary stipulate whether the uranium concentrate produced from decontamination of water, produced in the frame of the environmental remediation of the former uranium ore mine, is considered as radioactive waste from the point of view of the Joint Convention? What is the preferred management way? What are its radiological characteristics?	Answered	The uranium concentrate is not considered as radioactive waste. After a short (1-2 years) temporary storage period the total amount of concentrate is exported in the frame of a long-term contract, as yellow cake (UO <sub>2</sub> ·2H <sub>2</sub> O). The radiological characteristics are the same as that of yellow cake (67-69 % m/m of U-nat).		2022-03-31 13:49:56
24382	France	Hungary	Article 9	Section D.1, page 33	The expected date for the end of operations of the Training Reactor is 2023. The report from Hungary stipulates that the conditions for the interim storage of the SNF from the Training Reactor need to be developed, as well as the technologies for its removal from the reactor core. Can Hungary give more details about the timeframe for developing such solutions and conditions, and the potential facilities for storage of the SNF?	Answered	1. "The expected date for the end of operations of the Training Reactor is 2023." This statement is erroneous. The present operation license of the Training Reactor is valid until 2027 and they have the definite intention to extend the licence for another 10-year period. 2. "The report from Hungary stipulates that the conditions for the interim storage of the SNF from the Training Reactor need to be developed, as well as the technologies for its removal from the reactor core." This statement is correct. The experts of BUTE responsible for the operation of the Training Reactor have been working on the development of a method and technologies for the removal and transport of SNF from the reactor core. Results regarding the concrete method/technology are expected by the end of 2023. 3. "Can Hungary give more details about the timeframe for developing such solutions and conditions, and the potential facilities for storage of the SNF?" The methods/technology development of the transport of SNF is an ongoing project. The transport containers for the SNF of Training Reactor are available, as the fuel geometry is the same as it was used at Budapest Research Reactor during early years of operation. The external storage facility at the site of the Budapest Research Reactor is large enough to store the SNF of the Training Reactor as well.		2022-03-31 13:47:03
24381	France	Hungary	Article 5	Executive summary - page 14	The report from Hungary mentions "new NPP units" and "new reactors".  Could Hungary provide more details about the licensing process and schedule of such new production capacity, if the project is on track? Would the resulting spent fuel from operation be managed in the existing facilities? Notably, would the Interim Storage Facility for spent fuel (SFISF) require additional extension in addition to the 7 new chambers planned?	Answered	The new NPP units are scheduled to start commercial operation in 2029 and 2030. The spent fuel assemblies are going to be stored in the spent fuel pool for an additional 10 years.  The spent fuel of the new NPP units will not be stored in the present spent fuel interim storage facility. A new storage facility will be commissioned for this purpose. Thus, the recently operating SFISF will not require additional extension because of the new NPP units.		2022-03-31 13:45:25
24380	France	Hungary	Article 9	Section B.1, page 23	The report from Hungary mentions that the last repatriation of SNF from domestic non-power generating reactor to the Russian Federation was completed in 2013. Meanwhile, although the internal repository allows the storage of SNF out of BRR for a limited period of time (3-5 years), the external repository, designed to host after this first period of time, remains empty.  Could Hungary specify the fate of the SNF from BRR reactor, especially when taken out of the internal repository?	Answered	The SNF taken out from the BRR will be stored in the external SNF storage on the site. It has enough capacity to store fuels for 30-40 years operation. The external storage is in good state, the building and physical protection of the storage was upgraded in 2008.		2022-03-31 13:44:43
26408	Ireland	Hungary	Article 25	F.5.7, page 67-68	The proactive and leading role of Hungary and the HAEA as a host for and organiser of international emergency exercises (IAEA and EU) is acknowledged a good performance.	Answered	It is highly appreciated by Hungary that Ireland acknowledges the proactive and leading role of HAEA as host and organiser of international emergency exercises.		2022-03-31 13:42:52

28236	Norway	Hungary	Article 11	H. p. 76	The report indicates that the Solymar site was inadequate for long-term disposal of waste and that the site was closed in the 1980s. Are there plans to move radioactive waste from this facility to another site?	Answered	In 1980, from Solymár site all waste (900 m3) were transferred to the new disposal facility to Püspökszilágy. After transferring of the waste packages the radioactive contamination of the empty storage wells were tested. In case of extensive contamination or if the whole well-ring had been contaminated the whole well-ring was taken out after disrupting by pneumatic stretching instruments. If the whole well had been contaminated, the well was dug around and the concrete well-rings were hoisted out by a crane. In the area of the Solymár disposal site the radioactive contamination was eliminated by the removal of 5-10 cm of the upper soil layer. The site was filled with humus. During the next two decades the competent authorities monitored the radiological conditions in the area. Finally, the site was released for free use.		2022-03-31 13:42:08
28235	Norway	Hungary	Article 4	G. p. 71	5 categories of fuel types are identified. Are there arrangements for fuel with lower burn-up than 2 GW day/tU or does this not occur?	Answered	During a review we have identified that based on conservative assumptions the yield strength of the fuel cladding and of the spacer grid could be lower than the value associated with non-fracture point in strength analysis, up to a specifically low burnup level. According to the burnup yield strength correlation, this specific level is at 2 GWday/tU. Spent fuel assembly with lower burnup level cannot be transported to SFISF, they should be temporarily stored by the NPP. There are no spent fuel assemblies with such an extremely low burnup level in the NPP, and it is not expected to be in the future. The lowest burnup level of spent fuel assembly, which has been transported to the storage, is 5.36 GWday/tU.		2022-03-31 13:41:26
28234	Norway	Hungary	Article 32.1.1	Overview matrix, p.10	The matrix indicates that high activity radioactive waste/spent fuel disposal facility will be constructed in the future. Have timescales for the construction of such facilities been determined?	Answered	The Hungarian waste management organization, PURAM has developed a site investigation framework programme for the survey of the preferred site, Boda Claystone Formation. The framework programme covers three consecutive phases of surface based geological investigations and connected R&D activities. The programme after obtaining all the necessary licences and approvals, schedules the construction of the underground research laboratory after 2032 and by 2055 the beginning of the construction of the disposal facility itself, while by 2064 the commissioning of the facility.		2022-03-31 13:40:46
30051	Germany	Hungary	Article 28	p. 86	The fees charged for disposal are sufficiently low in order to ensure that the lack of financial resources on the side of users should not be an obstacle to safe disposal. Are the fees high enough to cover the actual disposal costs? If not, who will bear the remaining costs?	Answered	In the use of nuclear energy, safety prevails over all other aspects. As the Act CXVI of 1996 on Atomic Energy (Act on Atomic Energy) states, the licensee must pay the extent necessary to ensure that all radioactive waste is delivered to the landfill for safe disposal. In accordance with the provision of the Act on Atomic Energy the licensee must cover the required extent into the Central Nuclear Financial Fund to ensure the overall cost of activities, such as the disposal of radioactive waste, the interim storage of spent fuel and the completion of the fuel-cycle, as well as the decommissioning of nuclear facilities.		2022-03-31 13:40:12
30050	Germany	Hungary	Article 32.1.1	p. 32, p. 73	The spent fuel storage facility (SFISF) currently operates under the operation licence issued on 27 November 2018 by the HAEA for the expansion of the facility with vaults 21-24 based on the design of vaults 1-24. The licence is valid until 2 March 2030. An extension of the facility with four additional vaults with modified design is in progress. When was SFISF commissioned and what is the anticipated maximum operation time of the facility?	Answered	Commissioning of the SFISF – the reception building and the first 3 vaults - took place in 1997 by filling the first storage vault with 450 spent fuel assemblies. The operating lifetime of storage is planned up to 2072, but the licensing of lifetime extension must be pursued in the future and until then with a 10 years periodicity several Periodic Safety Reviews has to be carried out.		2022-03-31 13:39:29

30648	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 25	F	When describing the changes in the new version of the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan it is mentioned that the new plan also includes the strategy of protection. Is the protection strategy set in the plan only or are there/or will there be also other supporting legal documents also developed and adopted?	Answered	In the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan only the framework of the protection strategy is established. The protection strategy will be a separate document, it will be a guide for the National Nuclear Emergency Response Plan.		2022-03-31 13:38:44
30674	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	K	Between 2014-2017, the review of the site characteristics has been carried out for possible extreme parameters, as well as the examination of the impact of these extreme values on the safety barriers, and the analysis of the protection of the SFISF against external hazards has been performed. The HAEA accepted the submitted documentation in 2017. The results of the tests carried out satisfactorily demonstrated that the facility complies with the current safety standards and that there are margins beyond its design basis that ensure compliance with the post-Fukushima requirements. Please explain, which tests were carried out, what improvements, if any, were implemented based on tests, and which improvements are planned for the future safety upgrade. Could you please give more information about SFISF design basis for protection against the harmful effects of extreme weather conditions. How is the environmental changes monitored? Are the climate changes impact on the facility safety evaluated?	Answered	The tests covered the following events: extreme high temperature, tornado, forest fire, airplane crash, extreme rain, electromagnetic interference, uncontrolled release of radioactive liquid waste. Based on tests improvements were determined: for example administrative measures to avoid the electromagnetic effects and heavy snow load and also technical modifications (e.g. in the drainage system to withstand possible heavy rainfalls). The extreme weather conditions are 51,8 C° high temperature, 60 m/s high wind, 205,1 mm extreme rainfall, 108 cm snow load, F2 tornado category. The environmental parameters can be monitored, local meteorological data are available because in the vicinity of the storage facility a meteorological station is in operation. We evaluated the climate changes impact, it was taken into consideration in determining of the extreme environmental parameters.		2022-03-31 13:37:53
30676	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	K	In 2016, the PURAM commenced the preparation for the upcoming PSR, and in the following year it completed the review. The licensee submitted the Periodic Safety Review Report in November 2017 to the HAEA, which contained the results of the review, the deviations affecting the safety of the facility and the program of safety improvement actions. In 2018, based on the report, the authority terminated the review by a resolution in which it required the implementation of the actions. The obligations (the latest deadline of which is March 2022) are first of all aimed at developing or reviewing supporting analyses and administrative actions. Could you please describe in more detail what are the main issues coming from the PSR for storage and also planned actions based on the review?	Answered	The following main groups of actions were required based on the findings of the 2017-2018 Periodic Safety Review of the SFISF: <ul style="list-style-type: none"> <li>• some external hazards were needed to be re-evaluated based on new data – most of which came from the siting of the neighbouring Paks II NPP development: meteorology, climate change, road freight transport (focusing on Cl<sub>2</sub>, NH<sub>3</sub> and HCl transportation), air traffic and seismicity data;</li> <li>• the effects of an accident-level ("beyond design basis" level) earthquake was needed to be analysed;</li> <li>• operational documents for accident management were needed to be prepared;</li> <li>• the Safety Analysis Report (SAR) of the SFISF was needed to be updated with the results of the analysis of the unintentional storage of inhermetic fuel in the SFISF (note: only fuels that appear to be hermetic can be accepted to the SFISF);</li> <li>• the administrative measures to prevent the transportation of inhermetic fuel to the SFISF were needed to be strengthened;</li> <li>• the SAR is needed to be updated with the new site data.</li> </ul> <p>Since 2018 all of these obligations were fulfilled and the last one was also submitted (which had a deadline as of March 2022) in this case the regulatory review process is ongoing.</p>		2022-03-31 13:37:11
30678	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	K	It is stated on page 88 "The architectural parameters of these vaults do not change, only the placement of storage tubes will be constructed in a denser configuration, however construction of a new load deck will be necessary". Could you please describe what are the main features of the new load decks?	Answered	Due to the denser configuration of storage tubes the new load deck will consist of 2 parts. The upper part is a 36 cm thick steel plate with holes, the under part is a 56 cm high steel structure with concrete filling, the arrangement of storage tubes is provided by passing pipes.		2022-03-31 13:36:28

30680	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	K	<p>It is stated on page 92:  "Maximum temperature values determined in the safety assessments:  fuel cladding: 410 °C  concrete: 100 °C  storage tube: 300 °C  During storage the temperature of the fuel cladding is not measured."  How is the nuclear fuel clad damage process inside vaults detected? Is the repairing of the damage nuclear fuel elements provided on site?</p>	Answered	<p>The detection of fuel cladding damage in the storage tube is provided by gas sample measurement. Kr-85 activity concentration is measured, because the presence of this isotope indicates the leakage of fuel. The repairing of damaged fuel is not provided in the storage facility. Currently in such case the damaged fuel assembly would temporarily remain in the storage tube and the tube would be isolated and monitored. It is technically possible to transport back the leaking fuel to the nuclear power plant because the failed spent fuel assembly can be loaded into the hermetic canister at the end of the operating time of NPP. When this would happen the relevant licensing procedures must be pursued.</p>	2022-03-31 13:35:44
30681	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	L	<p>It is stated on page 132 that following the minimum decay period, spent fuel assemblies are handed over to the SFISF for further storage of about 50 years.  Does it mean that the design life time of SFISF is 50 years?  Was the SFISF operating license issued for 50 years' time period? What are the main conditions for the operating licence extension?</p>	Answered	<p>Yes, the design lifetime of interim storage is 50 years. Taking into account the time schedule of the deep geological repository implementation at least 25 years of lifetime extension will be required. The Ageing Management will play important role in preparation and licensing of storage lifetime extension. The operating licence of storage facility is not valid for 50 years, only till 2030, the main condition for operating licence extension is to perform the Periodic Safety Review.</p> <p>It is also to be noted that due to the ongoing extension of the SFISF the facility will most likely need a new operating licence sooner than 2030: currently vaults No. 1-24 are in operation at the SFISF and vaults No. 25-28 are being constructed. Once the new vaults are commissioned the SFISF will need a new operating licence valid for all 28 vaults.</p>	2022-03-31 13:34:48
30682	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 9	G	<p>Could you please indicate the operational experience and give some examples of deviations or events related to the storage of spent fuel facilities in your country.</p>	Answered	<p>Our operational experience is very good, the radioactive liquid release and airborne discharge values are far below limits and the personnel exposures are very low compared to the radiation protection limits (dose constraint). In the last years there were just few technical difficulties, for example problem with the filters and the fan belt in the ventilation system, failure of the gearbox of the shield plug hoist in the fuel handling machine, the leakage in the nitrogen monitoring system (the pressure in inter-stage spaces of the fuel storage tubes is monitored).</p>	2022-03-31 13:33:39
30684	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 9	G	<p>Are the procedures for spent fuel removal and repairing the spent fuel containers in case of events required? What is the approach in such situation?</p>	Answered	<p>In case of repairing of spent fuel storage tube we can relocate the spent fuel into other storage tube, since we have the fuel relocation licence. In case the storage tube can't be repaired, then the tube will remain empty and will be separated or we can replace the defective tube for a new one (technically feasible). Taking into account the ALARA-principle with the multifactor optimization the decision can be made.</p>	2022-03-31 13:32:37

30685	Slovenia	Hungary	Article 32	Executive summary	<p>It is written on page 15: As stated in the National Policy, the disposal of high level radioactive wastes shall be provided in a repository constructed in Hungary, within a stable deep geological formation. In line with the uniform international standpoint, such a repository is suitable to directly dispose spent fuel, and it is also suitable to host wastes generated during the processing of the spent fuel, depending on the chosen fuel cycle closure strategy. At this point, the policy on radioactive waste disposal is linked with the policy on fuel cycle closure; the deep geological radioactive waste repository shall be designed and constructed in a way that allows disposing high activity and long-lived radioactive wastes, as well as spent nuclear fuel.</p> <p>In the text above you explained the design of a deep geological repository that will accept spent nuclear fuel. Does the design also enable re-takeover of spent fuel for the reprocessing of spent fuel for the needs of future generations of NPP?</p>	Answered	<p>It is provided in Govt. Decree 155/2014. (VI.30.) on the safety requirements for facilities ensuring interim storage or final disposal of radioactive wastes and the corresponding authority activities, that the retrievability of the disposed radioactive waste (and spent fuel if it is regarded as waste) shall be provided before the closure of the repository. As part of the design and construction of the future deep geological repository this requirement will be taken into account.</p>	2022-03-31 13:31:18
30695	Croatia	Hungary	Article 6	page 74	<p>The National Report of Hungary indicates that the Site investigation frame programme for the BCF (as an area proposed for future national deep geological repository) was approved by the HAEA in 2019. Question: Could Hungary give an update on the implementation of this investigation frame programme in the period from its approval in 2019?</p>	Answered	<p>Since 2019, 3 deep boreholes with a total depth of 3050 m were drilled at the BCF site, and investigated with in situ geophysical and hydraulic methods. Multipacker systems were installed in each for long-term monitoring. An extensive scientific programme was carried out to assess evaluation of the carstic area next to the site. Probable socio-economical effects of the siting, construction and operation of the facility were evaluated.</p>	2022-03-31 13:29:19
30694	Croatia	Hungary	Article 12	Introduction	<p>The National Report of Hungary indicates that the interim and final storage of radioactive waste is regulated by the Govt. decree and that 10 guidelines were developed to support the application of the decree. Question: Could Hungary explain the legal status of these guidelines? Are they part of Govt. decree or just non-binding auxiliary documents?</p>	Answered	<p>Govt. Decree 118/2011. (VII.11.) on nuclear safety requirements of nuclear facilities and the related regulatory activities includes 10 annexes. Govt. Decree 155/2014. (VI. 30.) on the safety requirements for facilities ensuring interim storage or final disposal of radioactive wastes and the corresponding authority activities includes 3 annexes. The HAEA issues guidelines to help licensee to comply with the requirements. The already issued 11 guidelines are non-binding auxiliary documents, if the licensee does not follow the methods of guidelines, the compliance with the legal requirements should be justified in each case.</p>	2022-03-31 13:28:34
31216	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 9	K2/90	<p>Could you explain why the time for last two rows (III and IV) is shorter (8 years) than current works on rows I and II (12 years)?</p>	Answered	<p>The most important difference between the two double rows is the capacity. The first two rows (I. and II.) contains 48 vaults 70 m<sup>3</sup> each, so the total volume is 3360 m<sup>3</sup>. The second two rows (III. and IV.) contains 6 vaults with 140 m<sup>3</sup> capacity and 12 vaults with 70 m<sup>3</sup> capacity, so the total volume is 1680 m<sup>3</sup>.</p>	2022-03-31 13:27:40
31215	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 10	G2/75	<p>Spent fuel of non-NPP origin is expected to be repatriated to country of origin. Could you provide information on the time schedule to arrange necessary agreements/contracts and on the status and plans to adopt/build necessary facilities?</p>	Answered	<p>"The policy of closing the fuel-cycle with regard to spent fuel not originating from nuclear power plants in Hungary, is that our country makes use of the possibility of returning it to Russia. The national policy and program for spent fuel and radioactive waste management takes it to account as reference. To this end negotiations are foreseen to prepare an intergovernmental agreement. The spent fuel can be stored safely at the site of the Budapest Research Reactor and all necessary assets are ready for use, if the transport is agreed. Hungary has experience from the previous transports organized between 2008-2013." "</p>	2022-03-31 13:26:46

31214	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 25	F/563-69	Do you have any pre-set scenarios for management of RAW originated from emergency situations or such management will be created during situation solution?	Answered	<p>"According to the National Emergency Response Plan (NERP), in case of area contamination, the control (guarding) of the area and radioactive waste generated is the responsibility of the police under the direction of the Inter-ministry Disaster Management Coordination Committee (IDMCC).</p> <p>Setting criteria for management (including storage and disposal) of the radioactively contaminated materials rests with the IDMCC (a detailed guidance is available in the HAEA website).</p> <p>According to the para of 9.2.2 NERP „Decision making for termination of the emergency situation“:</p> <p>Prior to terminating the emergency situation, if needed, a plan should be devised related to the management of radioactive waste generated as a consequence of the emergency. (but the follow-up management of the radioactive waste such as disposal is not detailed).</p> <p>In case the radioactive waste is generated in the nuclear site (NPP, storage facility), the operator of the facility is responsible for managing the emergency waste.</p> <p>In case of emergency waste generation outside the site, the survey and decision whether the materials (objects, crops, soil) should be classified as radioactive waste is made in the later phase of the emergency situation."</p>		2022-03-31 13:25:46
31213	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 32.2.4	D2.1/33-36	Could you provide information how the RAW classification reflects activity limits for your disposal facilities?	Answered	<p>Classification of radioactive wastes to low or intermediate level class shall be performed based on the activity concentration and specific exemption activity concentration (SMEAK) of the contained radioisotope.</p> <p>The processing and conditioning of the low and intermediate level wastes shall be provided by the waste generator in a way that complies with the waste acceptance criteria (WAC) developed for the disposal facility.</p> <p>Concerning the waste packages (waste matrix and packaging) among others the most important elements of the WAC are the surface dose rate, surface activity concentration and isotope specific activity concentration limits. The scenarios used for derivation of activity related WAC are detailed in the safety case documents. These scenarios are taking into account the operational period (normal operation and design basis incidents) and also the post closure period.</p> <p>So it can be summarized, that there is no direct interrelationship between the activity concentrations used for classification of RAW and the derived activity concentration limits as part of the WAC for the disposal facility.</p>		2022-03-31 13:25:09
31212	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 32.2.5	D1.2/33	Could you describe plans for management of spent fuel from Training reactor after the closure of the operation planned for 2023?	Answered	<p>The Training Reactor has a valid operating licence until 2027.</p> <p>The overall answer is elaborated connected to the previous question (32211).</p>		2022-03-31 13:24:00

31211	Czech Republic	Hungary	Article 32.1.2	B1,2/24	Could you provide information on updated plans for the end point of spent fuel from the Budapest Research Reactor and from the Training Reactor (or on the schedule of this update)?	Answered	<p>Storage of spent fuel from the Research Reactor is made technically possible through the pools around the reactor, while in the Training Reactor the spent fuel is stored in dry cask storage. Until the end of planned service life of these facilities, the storage of spent fuels has been resolved.</p> <p>The policy of closing the fuel-cycle with regard to spent fuel not originating from nuclear power plants in Hungary is that, our country makes use of the possibility of returning it to Russia. The national policy and program for spent fuel and radioactive waste management takes it into account as reference.</p> <p>High-enrichment fuel from the Research Reactor was returned to the Russian Federation under an agreement concluded in 2008 and 2013. In this case neither uranium nor plutonium or any product from processing was returned to Hungary.</p> <p>Should the repatriation option not be exploited in the future, as the bilateral agreement has expired and not yet renewed, the policy states that management and disposal of spent fuel from the Research Reactor and Training Reactor have to be taken place in Hungary.</p>	2022-03-31 13:23:07
31345	Portugal	Hungary	Article 28	Page 86	Has Hungary considered establishing as an authorization requirement, the return of disused sources to the manufacturer/supplier in case of import of sources (if the sources were originally purchased from foreign manufacturers/suppliers)?	Answered	<p>The Govt. decree 487/2015. (XII. 30.) on the protection against ionizing radiation and the corresponding licensing, reporting (notification) and inspection system regulates the task of returning of disused sources in Section 40 (2) as follows: „A radioactive source belonging to Categories 1-3 of the Physical Protection decree shall only be bought with return guarantee of the manufacturer.” Generally, the regulation does not differentiate between import sources and sources produced in Hungary, the same requirement is applied for any radioactive source.</p>	2022-03-31 13:22:37